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x-Per. 2 Mr. Clark

Bear On The Steppes


The Backdrop

By
Charles Lucey

You would have trouble finding an American who knows more about the Russian Communist mind and Soviet tactics than Gen. Mark W. Clark. He has dealt with the Russians in Austria, London, Moscow and Korea. He was United States commander and high commissioner in Austria. He was supreme commander of the United Nations forces in Korea. He participated in London and Moscow in the Council of Foreign Ministers negotiating the Austrian treaty.

Recently General Clark said this:

"I hear a great deal about the spirit of Geneva and the smiles of the Russians. Many people who should know better seem to think they denote a change in objectives and intentions of the Communists. I cannot go along with that sort of thinking. I am sure the objective of the Russians is still world domination."



"Perhaps they think that by smiling they can anesthetize us. But we must be on our guard. Honesty is no part of their national policy."

Now that doesn't quite accord with the picture the Muscovites have been trying to sell these last two or three months—a picture many U. S. leftist-liberals, perhaps never really unsold on what they believed the noble motives of the Soviets, have been quite ready to accept in 1955.

It doesn't quite accord with the vodka-pouring at the Soviet Embassy in Washington on the anniversary of the revolution that put Lenin and Trotsky in power—a festive affair largely shunned in recent years but having a certain fashionable acceptance this time.

It doesn't quite accord with Russian delegates stepping up to the bar at the United Nations to show they're really awfully decent fellows, or with the Russians contributing \$25,000 for New England flood relief, or with Soviet delegations dashing about the U. S. professing good will toward men.

But it accords indeed with what happened at the second Geneva. Despite face-saving statements the conferences among the Big Four foreign ministers, which were supposed to build on the foundations of the Summer Geneva meeting, were dismal and disheartening.

The West's proposals for free elections in Germany were doomed by Soviet insistence on conditions which seemed to remove all hopes of early settlement of the German problem. East and West were just as far apart on the two other principal matters discussed at the second Geneva—disarmament and breaking the barriers to East-West communications in exchange of ideas and peoples and goods.

It had seemed so roseate in midsummer. Yet at the first Geneva—although the matter was

raised by President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles—there was no real response by the Russians to one of the most basic tests of the whole Soviet position. That is, will Moscow demonstrate sincerity about its new position by calling off its propagandists and spies and infiltrationists in countries all over the globe?

Recently Allen Dulles, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, had something to say about Russian subversion around the world.

"Looking at the hard evidence we have," he said, "I don't see that we have any real reason to believe that certainly in the covert field and the field of subversion there has been any relaxation whatever."

Mr. Dulles said he did not see that the Soviets were stopping any of their subversive activities in Indochina, Indonesia or other world areas where they are trying particularly to strengthen their position.

Allen Dulles is the brother of Secretary of State Dulles. It does not stretch imagination too far to think that of an evening they may have checked their findings and conclusions. At Geneva before the most recent foreign ministers' meeting broke up, Secretary of State Dulles told Soviet Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov: "I wonder whether an agreement with the Soviet Union is worth much."

Every shred of evidence there is makes it clear this is no time for soft-headedness about Russian intentions.

Recently Senator Mike Mansfield, Montana Democrat and one of the ablest men in the U. S. Senate, returned from Europe to warn against relaxation in the free countries under a false atmosphere of peace. He asserted that disarmament moves by the U. S. before the "crucial tests" of Soviet policy could be disastrous. If we confuse an atmosphere of peace with the actuality of peace, he said, we have no one to blame but ourselves. His comments were not casual but the result of a Senate Foreign Relations Committee assignment to study the impact of the first Geneva meeting on Europe.

It would be very easy to reduce defense spending and give everyone a tax cut next year. Moscow might like it even better than American taxpayers. But it would happen at the peril of these United States. That's still a bear off there on those steppes.

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